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Abstract
Growth of network access technologies in the mobile environment has raised several new issues due to the
interference between the available access. Thanks to the currently used access methods such as the orthogonal
frequency division multiple access in mobile networks and the long term evolution-advanced systems, the intra-cell
interferences are avoided and the quality of service has increased. Nevertheless, the diversity and multiplicity of base
stations in the network have left behind a major problem of inter-cell interferences. In this paper, we focus on the
optimization of the total throughput of cellular networks using fractional frequency reuse and allowing each mobile
user to individually choose its serving base station. We derive analytically the utilities related to the network manager
and mobile users and develop a Stackelberg game to obtain the equilibrium. We propose a distributed algorithm that
allows the base stations, using a light collaboration, to achieve an efficient utilization of the frequencies, with the optic
of maximizing the total system utility. This algorithm is based on stochastic gradient descent which requires some
information to be exchanged between neighboring base stations. At user association level, we propose an iterative
distributed algorithm based on automata learning algorithm. Both algorithms allow the system to converge to the
Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, simulation results carried out based on a realistic network setting show
promising results in terms of global utility and convergence issues. In this setting, we include scenarios with a varying
number of users and address the problem of robustness and scalability of the proposed approach.
Introduction
Recently, the use of self-organizing network (SON) fea-
tures in a framework of general policy management has
been suggested. In such frameworks, SON entities are
used as a means to enforce high-level operator policies,
introduced in the management plane, and translated into
low-level objectives guiding coordinated SON entities
[1]. Among the most important self-optimization mech-
anisms in radio access networks (RAN) are interference
coordination [2], mobility management, and energy sav-
ing [3]. Several such problems need further investigation
to fully benefit from SON in RAN, in areas where little
material has been published. Examples are autonomous
cell outage management and coverage capacity optimiza-
tion [4]. It is noted that the problem of coordinating
simultaneous SON processes is an open and challenging
problem that needs to be addressed in order to allow the
deployment of SON mechanisms.
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In this paper, we propose a self-optimization framework
for inter-cell interference coordination in an orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) network.
Inter-cell interference can dramatically degrade cell per-
formance and perceived quality of service (QoS), particu-
larly at cell edge.We are interested in distributed solutions
that can be implemented in a flat architecture (e.g., long
term evolution (LTE)-Advanced architecture). To coor-
dinate interference between neighboring cells, eNodeBs
need to exchange information. In the case of LTE, for
example, signaling between eNodeBs can be exchanged
over the X2 interface (see Figure 1). Recent works such as
fractional frequency reuse [5,6] and soft frequency reuse
[7] allowing users in different channel conditions to bene-
fit from different reuse patterns have been proposed. Still,
all of these schemes mentioned above are static inter-
ference management approaches, where a specific reuse
pattern is predetermined a priori by a network operator at
offline.
Specifically, we assume that the fractional frequency-
reuse (FFR) of a cell can be configured dynamically. In
© 2013 Sidi et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Figure 1 The multi-cell network model. This figure specifies the network model and framework under which we develop our approach.
that case, some base stations (BSs or eNodeBs) would
be enabled to adjust their FFR in order to provide
coverage/capacity for other neighboring cells. We fur-
ther model the network behavior as a Stackelberg game
between the network manager and the mobile users using
the game theory framework [8].
At the core lies the idea that introducing a certain degree
of hierarchy in non-cooperative games not only improves
the individual efficiency of all users but can also be a way
of reaching a desired trade-off between the global network
performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount
of signaling. The proposed approach can be seen as an
intermediate scheme between the totally centralized pol-
icy and the non-cooperative policy. It is also quite relevant
for flexible networks where the trend is to split the intel-
ligence between the network infrastructure and mobile
users’ equipments. In the Stackelberg game, the network
manager is acting as the leader and mobile users as the
followers. In the first stage, the leader chooses its strategy
profile and announces it to the followers. Then, the fol-
lowers decide their respective outcomes depending on the
strategy profile of the leader. Under our scenario, the net-
workmanagermaximizes the total network throughput by
means of power control and announces its strategy pro-
file to mobile users. Each mobile will decide individually
to which of the available base stations it is best to connect
according to its radio condition and the strategy profile
broadcasted by the network.
We also propose a two-stage self-optimization algo-
rithm for both the leader and the followers. The objective
is to achieve dynamically an efficient frequency reuse
pattern based on their past experience and their learning
capabilities. The leader’s algorithm is based on stochas-
tic gradient descent algorithm which requires some
information to be exchanged between neighboring base
stations. For user association, we propose an iterative
distributed algorithm based on automata learning mech-
anisms. Both algorithms have been shown to converge
to the Stackelberg equilibrium while providing substan-
tial gain compared to optimal solution and fixed full reuse
scheme.
The original contributions of our approach are
threefold:
• Investigating fractional frequency reuse technique for
inter-cell interference coordination in an OFDMA
network
• Modeling the interaction between the network and
mobiles using a Stakelberg game framework
• Proposing a hierarchical algorithm that allows
convergence towards the Stackelberg equilibrium
In comparison to our previous work [9] presented at
Wireless Days 2011, this papera extends with richer devel-
opments the materials presented before. Especially, we
further explore the case when the network environment is
dynamic. By dynamic, we mean that the number of users
varies in time with mobiles arriving and departing the
system. Through extensive simulations based on a realis-
tic network setting, the proposed approach is shown to
be robust and scalable. In this latter setting, we also give
some insight on how to design a trade-off between the
global network performance at the equilibrium and the
requested amount of signaling. More clearly, the following
contributions have been developed:
• Addressing convergence and stability properties of
our distributed mechanisms with an evaluation of the
computational cost.
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• Exploring the robustness of the proposed approach
with time-varying number of users, thus simulating a
seamless dynamic environment.
• Giving some insight on the ways of finding a desired
trade-off between the desired global network
performance and the amount of control feedback.
• At the equilibrium, our mechanisms achieve up to
90% of the optimal association policy, with similar
results with partial exchange of information or
perturbed environment.
The paper is organized as follows: The system model
is exposed in the ‘The system model’ section. The
‘Network resources’ section provides a description of
the network scenario adopted throughout the paper. In
the ‘Hierarchical game formulation’ section, we present
the game theoretic framework and propose formally how
the network manager and mobile users can obtain their
respective equilibria by means of a Stackelberg formula-
tion. In the ‘Learning for optimal decision’ section, the
proposed hierarchical algorithm is investigated for both
the leader and the followers. In the ‘Implementation and
validation’ section, simulation results under realistic wire-
less network settings are shown to exhibit interesting
features in terms of self-optimizing deployment for inter-




Consider the downlink of a multi-cell system, operating in
anOFDMA context giving rise to an inter-cell interference
phenomenon. Power control is used by the base stations
in an effort to preserve power and to limit interference
and fading effects.With the same goal of maximizing their
payoff, mobile users try to connect to the best serving
cell. Specifically, we consider M = {1, . . . ,M} as the set
of all possible serving base stations (or cells) within the
network andK = {1, . . . ,K} as a set ofK mobile users ran-
domly distributed over the network. Each cell operates in
a multi-band context with N physical resource blocks
(PRB). Let N = {1, . . . ,N} be the set of N PRBs per cell.
Mobile users strategies sk are the choice of a PRB n at a
given BS j, i.e., sk = (j, n). Hence, the signal received by a
mobile user k using strategy sk depends not only on the BS
transmit power but also on the interferences introduced
by the other cells. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) measured at the user k associated with BS j
can be expressed for all j ∈ M and k ∈ K as follows:
SINRj,k =
hj,k · P(sk)
σ 2 + ∑
l =k
hj′,k · P(sl) · f (sk , sl) , (1)
where hj,k is the block fading process measured at user
k associated with BS j, P(sl) is the power received from
BS i at PRB n′ for mobile user l with sl = (j′, n′), and σ 2
is the noise variance. The interference function f (sk , sl) is
defined as follows:
f (sk , sl) =
⎧⎨
⎩




A key example of dynamic resource allocation is that of
power control, which serves asmeans for both battery sav-
ings at the mobile as well as interference management in
the network. Formally, in this work, we assume that the
network manager optimizes its global utility by means of
power control optimization. Let P be the (M × N) power
control matrix whose element P(j, n) represents the power
received from BS j ∈ M at PRB n ∈ N . Given these opti-
mized power levels P, mobile users choose the association
actions that optimize their individual utilities. Notice that
the maximization of the total throughput by the network
manager is based on information sent by mobile users on
interferences experienced from neighboring cells. We fur-
ther assume that each base station can allocate a PRB to
only one mobile user at a given time slot.
Hierarchical game formulation
We make use of a hierarchical equilibrium solution con-
cept, i.e., the Stackelberg game, where the network man-
ager is acting as the leader and mobile users are the
followers. In view of maximizing its utility, the leader
enforces its strategy on the followers that react rationally
to this enforcement. A mobile user can decide to either
transmit data or stay silent depending on its utilityb We
assume that each mobile k has a target SINR noted by ηk
which reflects its required QoS. Let Hk ⊂ M be the set
of base stations within a radius of r from user k such that
r ≤ ( Pmax
ηk ·σ 2 )
1/β where β is the path loss coefficient and Pmax
is the maximum power at each base station. The motiva-
tion behind doing so is that, for computation purpose, one
may only consider the subset Hk rather than the original
setM. Let wk be the user’s strategy when the user decides
to stay silent on that specific slot. Hence, the set of mobile
user actions is k = Hk × N ∪ wk . Mobile user utility





1I{SINRj,k>ηk} − , if sk = wk
0, otherwise
(3)




is the throughput of user k associated to BS j. This means
Sidi et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:119 Page 4 of 13
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/119
that if a mobile user decides to transmit, it obtains either
a utility equal to its transmission rate (Rj,k) or a negative
utility (−) depending on its SINR. Otherwise, the mobile
user decides to stay silent (v(sk) = 0). As a result, this
tends to lead users who do not contribute enough utility to
outweigh the interference degradation and remain silent.
In order to provide a right balance between efficiency and
fairness between cells, one possible remedy would be to
use the so-called α-fairness [10]. This guarantees that any
point in which one BS is shut down cannot be a local














, if α = 1 (4)
where Uj = ∑
k
Rj,k and α is the fairness parameter. The
network manager is assumed to perfectly know the set of
strategies and the utilities of the K mobile users. Simi-
larly, it is guaranteed under this setting that the followers
can observe the actions of the leader through the broad-








P(j, n) ≤ Pmax ;∀j ∈ M
(5)
where sNE is a Nash equilibrium among K mobiles con-
sidering the strategy of the leader.
Let S = {1×·· ·×K } be the strategy space of our one
shot game and s = (sk , s−k) a strategy profile in the game.
Mathematically, the Nash equilibrium can be expressed
by the following inequality for all association strategies
s ∈ S :
vk(sk , s−k) ≥ vk(rk , s−k); ∀ k = 1, . . . ,K (6)
for every rk ∈ k and s−k ∈ −k where−k = {1×·· ·×
k−1×k+1×···×K } is the joint feasible strategy space
of all users but the kth one.
Learning for optimal decision
The interaction between the leader and the followers pro-
vides a potential incentive for both agents to make a deci-
sion process based on their respective perceived payoff.
This section focuses on how to reach the Stackelberg equi-
librium for both the leader and the followers. To accom-
plish the task of global optimization problem, a two-stage
optimization algorithm is proposed. One difficulty in our
context is that mobile users do not know the payoffs (thus
the strategy) of each other at each stage. Thus, the envi-
ronment of each mobile user, including its opponents,
is dynamic and may not insure convergence of the algo-
rithm. In [11], authors develop a a Nash-Stackelberg fuzzy
Q-learning in a heterogeneous cognitive network. As an
alternative way, we adopt a hierarchical algorithm. The
proposed approach requires neighboring base stations to
exchange load (or interference) information experienced
at user level on regular intervals. Consequently, the hier-
archical algorithm is performed based on a coordination
on both local (user level) and global scope (network level),
which could scale accordingly.
As far as the two-stage learning algorithm is concerned,
this can be conducted in the following steps: First, every
user reports to its serving base station the experienced
interference from neighboring cells. Then, the interfer-
ence information is exchanged between base stations over
the X2 interface while trying to optimize the global net-
work utility by means of power control. Based on these
power levels (broadcasted by BSs), each user checks dis-
tributively whether the serving BS is still the best choice
according to its utility. Otherwise, it can perform a han-
dover to the other RANs after checking that it could be
admitted on it. As a result, this approach tends to substan-
tially reduce signaling overhead from the base stations.
Leader: gradient computation mechanism
In this section, we propose an operational way of com-
puting the derivative of the global utility in a distributive
fashion. At each time epoch, consider that each mobile
user k reports to its base station j the matrix (b1jk , . . . , b
Mj
k ),
where bmjk = (P(m, n′) · hm,k , n′ ∈ N ) is the vector of
interferences perceived by user k from base station m or
its signal strength on sub-band n when m = j. In the
scope of this paper, and without lost of generality, we con-
sider that only one user can interfere per base station with
another user from a neighboring base station if they use
corresponding channels. Hence, adjacent channel inter-
ferences are not included, and we assume that users are
not allocated more than one PRB at the time. The vector
bmjk restricts then to a single interference value for each














⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ and send the matrices aj = (a
j
k ,







1 , . . . , b
j ′j
K




to each base station j ′. To illustrate our mechanism, we
depicted in Figure 2 the exchange flow of information. The
exchange of information works as follows:
(1) The UE collects interference information from each
neighbor over every allocated RBs and forwards the
obtained vector to its serving eNodeB.
(2) Once information is received at the eNodeB from all
the attached users, an interference matrix is built that
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Figure 2 Exchange of information sequence.
contains interference information from each
neighbor (M neighbors on the figure).
(3) Interference load is then put on format for each
neighbor.
(4) Finally, each neighbor receives on the X2 interface
the interference information concerning all the
covered mobiles.
The derivative of the utility from base station j com-
























































∂P(j ′,n) . We then need to express
∂Uj
∂P(j ′,n) for all j, assuming we are considering cell j
′.
Because the derivative goes the same for every sub-band,
we will focus only on one particular sub-band n. It can be
easily shown that ∂Uj
∂P(j ′,n) is given by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎛
⎜⎝ hj ′ ,k
σ 2x +∑
m




P(m, n) · hj,m
⎞





P(m, n) · hj,m
⎞
⎠ ; if j= j ′.
The pseudo-code for the proposed gradient descent
approach is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
In each base station j ′
1. Find the value of dU
∂P(j ′,n) (Pt(j
′, n)) at time t, given the
current power level Pt(j ′, n).
2. Express Pt+1(j ′, n) = Pt(j ′, n) + γt ∂U∂P(j ′,n) (Pt(j ′, n)) to
have new values of the power vector at time t + 1.
3. Allocate the powers to each sub-band, and let the users
associate (see Algorithm 2).
4. Receive feedback from users and build the hypermatrix
B.






Pt+1(j ′, n) − Pt(j ′, n)
)) ≤  stop; else go to 1.
End algorithm.
Note that the implementation of gradient-like algo-
rithms is familiar in optimization problems. The conver-
gence of such algorithms has been shown in [12], under
some specific conditions such that the derivative of objec-
tive function is Lipschitz continuous which is satisfied
here, and for an accurate choice of γt .
Proposition 1. The derivative of our utility function is
Lipshitz continuous.
Proof. If sk = wk , the utility function is given by
U =
{
−  if SINRjk > ηk
Rjk +  otherwise.
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Again, SINRjk > ηk =⇒ U = Rjk + . Let us show that









σ 2 + ∑
m =j
P(m, n)hm,k





if j = j ′
.
Then, for another value P1(j ′, n) of power level on chan-










σ 2 + ∑
m =j ′
P(m, n)hm,k + P(j, n)hj,k + P1(j ′, n)hj ′ ,k
− hj ′k
σ 2 + ∑
m =j,j ′
P(m, n)hm,k + P1(j ′, n)hj ′ ,k
− hj ′k
σ 2 + ∑
m =j ′
P(m, n)hm,k + P(j, n)hj,k + P2(j ′, n)hj ′ ,k
+ hj ′k
σ 2 + ∑
m =j,j ′
P(m, n)hm,k + P2(j ′, n)hj ′ ,k ‖ if j = j
′
‖ hjk
σ 2 + ∑
m =j
P(m, n)hm,k + P1(j, n)hj,k
− hjk
σ 2 + ∑
m =j
P(m, n)hm,k + P2(j, n)hj,k ‖ if j = j
′














≤ ‖ 1C2 ‖‖P2(j, n)−P1(j, n)‖.
We have
C = σ 2/hj,k + 1/hj,k
∑
m =j
×P(m, n)hm,k , since hj,k is an attenuation factor












‖P2(j, n) − P1(j, n)‖







′, n) − P1(j ′, n)(
C + P1(j ′, n) + P(j,n)hj,khj ′ ,k
) (
C + P2(j ′, n) + P(j,n)hj,khj ′ ,k
)
− P2(j
′, n) − P1(j ′, n)(
C + P1(j ′, n)
) (













C+P1(j ′, n)+P(j,n)hj,khj ′,k
)(
C+P2(j ′, n)+P(j,n)hj,khj ′,k
) ‖





C + P1(j ′, n) + P2(j ′, n) + P(j,n)hj,khj ′ ,k
]
C4 ‖‖P2(j
′, n) − P1(j ′, n)‖
≤‖Pmax(C + 3Pmax)C4 ‖‖P2(j
′, n) − P1(j ′, n)‖
≤‖Pmax(σ
2 + (M + 2)Pmax)
σ 8
‖‖P2(j ′, n) − P1(j ′, n)‖
This ends the proof.
In our computations, we use the implementation of
WOLFE linear search to find an appropriate value of γt at
each iteration.
On another hand, at each iteration, the gradient algo-
rithm delivers the values of the power vector for each
base station that can go out of the bounds of the allowed
space. To handle this problem, we implement a compu-
tational mechanism to satisfy the power constraint in (5).




to relax the prob-
lem, where c is built as follows:
Define ξ = {n ∈ N s.t. P(j, n) > pth} , where pth is a
threshold value for every PRB n s.t.
∑
n







; if ∃ k ∈ ξ and∑
n
P(j, n) ≥
Pmax, set the values of each P(j, n), using the projection
P¯(j, n) = min
(
δ
|ξ | + pth, P(j, n)
)
. It is to say that the
remaining power on each BS power budget, if any, is
evenly shared among the channels requiring a power level
above the threshold value.
Followers: pursuit algorithm
At the user level of our Stakelberg framework, we use the
pursuit algorithm as a tool to allow users to reach iter-
atively and individually a Nash equilibrium. The pursuit
algorithm is a distributed association algorithm proposed
in [13] allowing each individual in a set of players to
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select a given strategy, among several others, that will best
maximize its utility within a limited number of iterations.
Algorithm 2
At each iteration t
1. Select a strategy sk ∈ k according to the current
powers level P.





and provided utility vk (sk).




psk (t + 1) = psk (t) + δ
(
1 − psk (t)
)
psi (t + 1) = psi(t) − δpsi(t), i = k
5. ifmax
(|psi (t + 1) − psi(t)| < ) stop, else go to 1.
End Algorithm
It has been proven in [13] that the pursuit algorithm
always converges under some specific conditions on the
step size parameter. They show that when the step size
parameter is very small, the game converges to a stable
equilibrium for the learning automata game. This algo-
rithm has the property to converge to an extremum of
the game when there exists a pure equilibrium. To reach
mixed equilibrium, the authors in [14] present a dis-
tributed algorithm that can be used in such situations.
However, mixed equilibria are not efficient in our context
since it will leadmobile users to process continuously han-
dovers between base stations. To avoid mixed equilibria,
we introduce a cost of handovers in the utility func-
tion to give more incentive to mobile users in reaching
pure equilibria.
Discussion on cost of handover
As stated in the previous paragraph, a major weakness of
the learning algorithm in mobile networks is the number
of handovers, especially when the algorithm converges to
mixed equilibria. We try to tackle this issue by introduc-
ing a cost of handover as a reward in the utlity function
to users who are not operating handovers. User utility






1I{SINRj,k>ηk} −  + αh, if sk = wk
0, otherwise
(8)
where αh = βh(1 − 1I{handoff}) and βh is a small positive
value. In Figure 3, we compare the number of han-
dovers with and without the defined handover control.
On the figure, we can see that the handover control
policy decreases considerably the number of handovers
and that the system remains stable after a few iterations.
Interestingly, we noticed in our simulations that users are
more motivated in following the handover control when
the control is a reward rather than a penalty as we sug-
gested in the first place. A trade-off on using such control
can be seen at the utility side. As shown in Figure 4, the
gap in utility between the two policies can be marginal.
Implementation and validation
To go further with the analysis, we resort to realistic net-
work simulations. We consider a cellular radio network
as described in Figure 1 where users are attempting to
communicate during a downlink transmission, subject to
mutual inter-cell interferences. Specifically, a hexagonal
cellular system functioning at 1.8 GHz where the cell
radius is equal to R = 200 m is considered. Note that this






















Number of HO with HO control
Number of HO without HO control
Figure 3 Comparision of the number of handover.We compare two different approaches where mobile users use or do not use a penalty factor
to control the switching rate. The number of handovers operated over iterations is plotted in this figure for the two approaches.
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FFR with HO control
Full reuse with HO control
FFR without HO control
Full reuse without HO control
Figure 4 Comparision of network utilities. This figure shows the performances in terms of overall network utility, when mobile users control or
do not control the switching rate.
radius only stands for geographical positions in the net-
work. It does not prevent users located out of this area
to connect with another base station in case of signifi-
cant connection opportunity. Channel gains are based on
the COST-231 path loss model [15] including log-normal
shadowing with a standard deviation of 10 dB, plus fast
fading assumed to be i.i.d. circularly symmetric with dis-
tribution CN (0, 1). The peak power constraint is given by
Pmax = 100 mW. We evaluate under those settings the
joint processing of the gradient descent algorithm with
the pursuit algorithm. Without loss of generality, we
assume that every cell has the same number of users ran-
domly positioned inside the cell. We consider a cluster of
seven interfering cells, featured with ten PRBs each. The
values of the other parameters are set in Table 1.
The iteration scale parameter in Table 1 traduces how
frequently BSs update the gradient algorithm and set new
values of powers. By tunning this parameter, one can
Table 1 Simulations settings
Parameter descriptions Values
Number of cells 7
Number of PRBs per cell 10
Number of users per cell 4
Outer radius of hexagonal cells 200m
Distance to insure target SINR 300m
Fairness parameter α = 1
Iterations scalea 1 for 30
This table shows the values of different parameters used for the simulation
scenarios. In this table, we basically specify the structure of the network used for
our simulations. aThis is the scale of iterations between the gradient and
pursuit algorithms.
control the amount of signalization between BSs. We con-
sider in our simulations that users run 30 iterations of the
association algorithm for 1 iteration of the gradient. We
first build the framework for a fairness parameter α = 1
which represents the proportional fairness algorithm and
then extended it to different values of α.
Dynamic fractional frequency reuse
In Figure 5, we illustrate the snapshot of the dynamic
fractional frequency reuse pattern at the equilibrium. The
small colored disks indicate the positions of users inside
the cells, and the face colors are the frequencies used by
those users. Disks are indexed with a couple of values
(BS, power) where the first value represents the base sta-
tion to which this user is connected and the second the
power level assigned by the base station on that frequency.
As expected, users close to each other are attributed dif-
ferent frequencies, and power levels are set accordingly
to avoid a high level of interferences. From the same
figure, we also have an overview on user-network asso-
ciation. Indeed, many cases appear where users would
rather associate in a neighboring cell rather than in the
cell where they are positioned due to the influence of
path loss and/or interference impairments. For instance,
in Figure 5, the user indexed (2, 7.5) in cell 2 is connected
to BS 2 and is assigned frequency F2 with a high power
level. This reflects the maximization goal of the gradient
algorithm since frequency F2 is reused only once by a user
far away in cell 7 at a low power level.
Utility maximization
In Figure 6, we compare the proposed FFR algorithm with
traditional fixed reuse patterns, namely, the full reuse. The
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Figure 5 Snapshot of the dynamic fractional frequency reuse pattern at the equilibrium for α = 1. The figure shows the achieved FFR
pattern in the network when our learning mechanism attains the equilibrium for a fairness factor α = 1.
exhaustive search algorithm, shown as a dashed line, con-
siders all possible combinations of PRB selection given
the power level of the gradient algorithm. This will thus
serve as an optimal association solution for users and
will demonstrate just how much gain may theoretically be
exploited through the pursuit algorithm. It clearly appears
that the joint gradient and pursuit algorithms perform
better than the full reuse and reduce considerably the gap
with the exhaustive search. As shown in Figure 6, we reach
up to 90% of the overall network throughput compared to
the exhaustive (optimal) association search.
Fairness issues
In this section, we intend to show the impact of fair-
ness on the global utility maximization by simulating
different values of the α-fairness parameter. For α = 0






























Figure 6 Network utility for α = 1. In this figure, we plot the performances achieved by our mechanism in comparison with the global optimum
and a worst-case scenario for a fairness factor α = 1.
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Figure 7 Snapshot of the FFR system pattern for α = 0. The figure shows the achieved FFR pattern in the network when our learning
mechanism attains the equilibrium for a fairness factor α = 0.
(the maximum throughput algorithm), we can see from
Figure 7 that some BSs (BS 6 for instance) are set to
idle. Several other channels in the network are also
switched off, while a few number of users are attributed
very high levels of power. This behavior was somehow
expected since using α = 0 means that the major goal
of the network is to maximize the overall network utility.
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 8, this policy does not
help to tighten the gap to the exhaustive association search
(71%) as much as using a value of α = 1.
Further analysis of the max-min fairness policy (α→∞)
shows that most of the BSs are set to idle, and only a
few channels are activated. Being too fair leads then the
network to follow the policy of highly loaded BSs, thus




























Figure 8 Network utility for α = 0. In this figure, we plot the performances achieved by our mechanism in comparison with the global optimum
and a worst-case scenario for a fairness factor α = 0.
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Figure 9 Block call rate for different values of α. The figure shows the blocking probability for the different levels of fairness considered.
providing an overall network utility which is almost null.
Finally, we plot in Figure 9 the network block call rate
(BCR) for the increasing number of iterations obtained
when users follow the strategy corresponding to the
Stackelberg equilibrium. We can observe that the BCR
can be substantially reduced as the number of iteration
increases. Moreover, the fairness policy has a negligible
influence on the BCR which remains less than 10% for the
different fairness policies.
Robustness and scalability
Next, we evaluate in this section a seamless adaptation
of our algorithms to a dynamic environment. We sim-
ulate a discrete time system over several iterations and
generate a burst of user arrival at a specific time instant
during the simulation time. Indeed, while new arrivals
generally occur every minute in the cellular systems, our
association algorithm converges at the order of a few mil-
liseconds. This speed of reactivity and adaptation shows



















Burst of new arrivals
(One more user per cell)
Figure 10 Network utility for α = 0.98with the first-ring interference information. In this figure, we analyze the performances of our
mechanisms under a perturbed environment with a variation of the number of mobile users, where limited information is exchanged with only the
first-ring neighbors.
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Burst of new arrivals
(One more user per cell)
Figure 11 Network utility for α = 0.98with two neighbor interference information. In this figure, we analyze the performances of our
mechanisms under a perturbed environment with a variation of the number of mobile users, where limited information is exchanged with only two
of the closest neighboring sites.
improved performances of our hierarchical algorithm and
is traduced in Figures 10, 11, and 12. We consider two
rings of a small cell network where each base station is
featured with four PRBs and contains three users each,
randomly positioned inside the cell at the beginning of
the simulation. In this new setting, we assume that the
algorithm iteration scale is 1 for 100. For each of the sim-
ulated schemes, we assume that each BS can exchange
interference information only with a subset of all the
interfering neighbors. This consideration helps to under-
stand how the proposed scheme reacts when the amount
of information exchanged between BSs is limited.
For the first (Figure 10), second (Figure 11), and third
(Figure 12) scenarios, we consider that each BS exchanges
data, respectively, with the first-ring neighbors, only with
the two first closest neighbors, and finally with all the















Burst of new arrivals
(One more user per cell)
Figure 12 Network utility for α = 0.98with all neighbor interference information. In this figure, we analyze the performances of our
mechanisms under a perturbed environment with a variation of the number of mobile users, where full information is exchanged with all other sites
in the considered network area.
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interfering neighbors from the two considered rings. By
comparison of the different scenarios, it is observed that
more exchanged information lead, as one can intuitively
expect, to an increased outcome in utility. However,
although this can be imputed to randomness, when com-
paring Figures 10 and 12, we see that the system stability
is not necessarily insured by an increase of exchanged
information rate. On another hand, even with a very few
amount of exchanged information, our algorithm pre-
serves a convergence to 97% of the exhaustive association
search utility. From the same figures, we address the scal-
ability of our algorithms, with the introduction of a burst
of new arrivals in the system at iteration 200. Although
this event in not clearly captured in the case of Figure 11,
when less information is exchanged, we can observe from
Figures 10 and 12 that our mechanism adapts very fast to
the system evolution in order to reach the new point of
convergence.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the idea of a hier-
archical learning game for fractional frequency reuse in
an OFDMA network. In this framework, both the net-
work manager and mobile users learn to reach an equi-
librium that optimizes the global network utility while
ensuring individual utility optimization for mobile users.
We have first proposed formally a game model to define
how the network manager and mobile users can obtain
their respective equilibria by means of a Stackelberg for-
mulation. Then, we have presented a two-stage learn-
ing algorithm for finding a Stackelberg equilibrium and
the corresponding mobiles’ association strategies. Prac-
tical directions for implementability of our solution are
also presented. We have shown using several numerical
examples the efficiency of the obtained equilibrium com-
pared to the exhaustive (optimal) solution and a fixed full
frequency reuse pattern. In particular, in the case of pro-
portional fair policy, the proposed FFR approach offers
approximately 90% of the optimal association policy and
40% of gain with respect to the fixed full reuse. Indeed,
for implementation purposes and in order to adapt to the
dynamic of the mobile environment, the number of itera-
tions before convergence should remain in the order of a
few tens. Eventually, we have addressed interesting issues
such as fairness, robustness, and scalability and offered
insights into how to design such scenario in a wireless
network environment.
Endnotes
aThe work reported herein was partially supported by
the projects Ecocells.
bThough some users stay silent, they may be active
during the next scheduling period.
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